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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY  
In Australia, one in seven households is headed by a lone parent, one quarter of whom experience 
relative income poverty in a given year.  One way in which lone parent households are supported 
financially is through the child support paid by a non-resident parent.  
Child support schemes have been established in many countries in response to the increasing 
prevalence of lone parent families since the 1970s.  These schemes aim to ensure both parents 
remain financially responsible for their children in the event of relationship breakdown, to reduce 
the incidence of child poverty and to limit the costs of government transfers to support lone 
parents. 
Understanding the effects of child support receipt on government transfers and labour supply is 
important as child support policy is particularly contentious: an increase in the amount of child 
support deemed appropriate is a direct transfer from one parent to the other, and occurs in an 
emotionally charged environment. Without a strong evidence base for the effects of receiving 
child support, policymakers lack a basis on which to reconcile these competing interests. 
In Australia, child support interacts with government transfer receipt, with the level of Family Tax 
Benefit decreasing as the amount of child support received increases. This means that there is an 
effective tax on child support for child support payees receiving more than the base level of Family 
Tax Benefit, which in turn creates an incentive to increase labour supply and earnings to avoid this 
tax.  
Using recent, nationally representative data, I find that the receipt of any child support leads to a 
$8,503 reduction in government transfer receipt. Conditional on receiving any child support, a $1 
increase in the amount received leads to a 45 cent fall in the receipt of government transfers. A 
$1000 increase in child support received leads to a 2.9 percentage point reduction in the 
probability of being out of the labour force, and a 2.3 percentage point increase in the probability 
of working full time. 
These results have broad implications for the design of child support and government transfer 
systems. One way to increase the child support received by lone parents is to reduce the effective 
tax rate resulting from the interaction of child support with government transfers. However, doing 
this may reduce labour supply incentives and so have long-run implications for lone parents' 
human capital accumulation and retirement savings. 
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Abstract 
International evidence suggests that child support schemes provide a small but significant 
contribution to the household income of lone parents and have modest success in reducing 
child poverty. There are, however, concerns that receiving child support may discourage 
labour force participation. I use data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia (HILDA) survey to estimate the effect of receiving child support on government 
transfer receipt, earned income, hours worked and labour force participation of eligible 
mothers. OLS estimates of the effect of receiving child support on household behaviour may 
be biased as a mother's income partly determines the level of support received, and due to the 
interaction of child support with government transfers. I exploit information about the 
employment status of a child's non-resident father and find that receiving any child support is 
associated with a reduction in government transfers, an increase in earned income, and an 
increase in household income in excess of the amount of child support received. Mothers 
receiving child support are more likely to be in full time employment, work more hours per 
week, and are less likely to be out of the labour force. 
 
Keywords: child support; labour supply; lone parents; welfare receipt 
1 Introduction
Formal child support schemes have been established in many countries in response to
the increasing prevalence of lone parent families since the 1970s. The stated aims of
these policies vary across countries, but generally aim to ensure both parents remain
financially responsible for their children in the event of relationship breakdown, support
the standard of living of affected children, reduce the incidence of child poverty, and to
reduce the costs to the government of supporting lone parents (Skinner et al. 2012). The
extent of cost recovery varies across countries, ranging from no cost recovery in the UK
(ie. recipients receive all child support paid, regardless of government transfer receipt), to
full cost recovery in most US states where the effective tax rate on child support is 100%
for welfare recipients.1 This policy choice affects the labour supply implications of child
support receipt.
The child support received by a parent can be viewed as unearned income, leading
to concerns that the receipt of child support may discourage labour force participation
among recipient parents through a standard income effect. However, if receiving child
support reduces government transfers then child support is effectively taxed at a higher
rate when government transfers are received. This means that an increased level of child
support can encourage labour supply. It is therefore an empirical question whether child
support receipt affects labour supply.
This paper examines the household income and labour supply effects of child support
in Australia. The extent of cost recovery in Australia lies between the extremes of the
UK and most US states, with the effective marginal tax on child support at 50% and the
average effective child support tax rate of around 32%.2 This broadens our understanding
of the effects of the interactions between child support and welfare policy.
Understanding the effects of child support receipt is important as child support policy
is particularly contentious: an increase in the amount of child support deemed appropriate
is a direct transfer from one parent to the other, and occurs in an emotionally charged
environment. Without a strong evidence base for the effects of receiving child support,
policymakers lack a basis on which to reconcile these competing interests. Whilst there is
a body of empirical evidence suggesting mixed effects of child support on labour market
outcomes in the United States, there is far less in other countries, and in particular the
1See p.162–163 of Huber et al. (2014) for a full listing of state child support pass through and disregard
policies.
2This average rate is based on average child support liability and average number of children in 2008-
09 (latest available data) and applying that year’s maintenance income test (Commonwealth of Australia
2009). The effective tax is higher for those in social housing, whose rent increases with child support
receipt.
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paucity of strong evidence in Australia has been noted (Cook et al. 2011).
In this paper, I use data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Aus-
tralia (HILDA) survey to estimate the effect of child support receipt on the labour force
participation, government transfer receipt and earned income of eligible mothers in Aus-
tralia. In the Australian context, there is likely to be reverse causality between a mother’s
labour supply and her child support receipt due to the child support formula (which di-
rectly reduces the child support liability of the father as the mother’s income increases)
and due to the incentive to use the administrative ‘Child Support Collect’ transfer system.
Failing to account for this leads to an underestimation of the effect of child support on
labour market decisions.
I exploit variation in the amount of child support received resulting from (lagged)
changes in the employment status of the father of the child support child. By controlling
for a rich set of individual and geographical characteristics, the father’s prior employment
status affects the amount of child support received but does not affect the mother’s labour
market decisions except through the amount of child support received. Using the father’s
lagged employment status as an instrumental variable for child support receipt, I find that
receiving any child support leads to a $8,503 reduction in government transfer receipt, and
that conditional on receiving child support, a $1 increase in the amount received leads to
a 45 cent fall in the receipt of government transfers. Household market income increases
by $43,329 and $2.62 respectively. A $1000 increase in child support received leads to a
2.9 percentage point reduction in the probability of being out of the labour force, and a
2.3 percentage point increase in the probability of working full time.
Relaxing the assumption of the exogeneity of lagged father’s employment status using
the Imperfect Instrumental Variables method of Nevo and Rosen (2012) supports these
results, ruling out a significant increase in the receipt of government transfers and a
significant reduction in market income, full time employment and hours worked.
These results are in contrast to existing Australian estimates that do not account for
the endogeneity of child support receipt which find that receiving a higher level of child
support is associated with working fewer hours (Taylor and Gray 2010). However, they re-
flect findings from the United States which find that higher child support payments reduce
welfare dependence and increase hours worked (Hu 1999; Huang et al. 2002; Neelakantan
2009).
These results have broad implications for the design of child support and government
transfer systems. One way to increase the child support received by lone parents is to
reduce the effective tax rate resulting from the interaction of child support with govern-
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ment transfers. However, doing this has the potential to reduce labour supply incentives
which could have long-run implications for lone parents’ human capital accumulation and
retirement savings.
Section 2 describes the existing research on the labour market effects of child support.
Section 3 outlines the key features of the Australian Child Support Scheme, and section
4 describes how this policy is expected to affect labour market activity in a leisure-
consumption model. Sections 5 and 6 describe my data and empirical strategy, with
results presented in section 7. Section 8 describes the robustness checks relaxing the
instrumental variables assumptions.
2 Literature
This is a substantial body of research examining the effects of various aspects of child sup-
port policy in the United States. Higher levels of child support have been linked to higher
labour supply and lower welfare participation (Hu 1999; Huang et al. 2002; Neelakantan
2009), more contact with non-resident fathers (Nepomnyaschy 2007), lower levels of in-
formal support (Nepomnyaschy and Garfinkel 2010), and a lower propensity to cohabit
with a new partner (Cancian and Meyer 2014). As the level of child support increases,
lone mothers have higher household income, are less likely to live in poverty (Meyer and
Hu 1999), and are less likely to experience food insecurity (Garasky and Stewart 2007).
Receiving more child support is also associated with better child cognitive performance
(Amato and Gilbreth 1999), and better health outcomes for children (Baughman 2014).
On the other hand, there is some evidence that as the level of child support expected
increases, fewer child support orders are made (Roff 2010).
There is also a body of research examining the effects of stronger enforcement of child
support, exploiting state and time variation in the methods of enforcement available and
funding allocated. Stronger enforcement of child support is associated with higher child
support payments (Freeman and Waldfogel 2001), though the importance of funding to
support enforcement activities is noted. Births to teenagers and to unmarried women eligi-
ble for welfare are lower with stronger child support enforcements (Aizer and McLanahan
2006; Plotnick et al. 2004), and lone mothers are more likely to exit and remain off welfare
(Huang et al. 2002). Stronger enforcement is also associated with more contact with the
non-resident parent (Peters et al. 2004).
The interaction of child support with the welfare system – that is, the amount of
child support disregarded by the welfare system – has also been examined. When the
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amount of income disregarded is higher (and so the receiving parent keeps more of the
child support paid), more child support orders are made (Roff 2010) and in-kind child
support is higher (Gunter 2013), reflecting a higher propensity of non-resident parents to
contribute to the costs of raising their children when more of the money paid reaches the
children. Relatedly, a higher level of child support debt results in fathers being less likely
to work (Cancian et al. 2013).
Outside of the United States, there is far less evidence on the effect of child support
payments. Walker and Zhu (2006) find that a higher level of child support in the United
Kingdom is associated with reduced dissolution risk amongst intact couples. Using Danish
register data and exploiting discontinuities in child support guidelines, Rossin-Slater and
Wu¨st (2015) find that higher child support payments cause lower labour force participation
from fathers, and higher new-partner fertility.
Whilst there is a body of Australian research considering child support, much of this
is descriptive or qualitative (Cook et al. 2011). The most relevant study for this analysis is
Taylor and Gray (2010), who use data from the Longitudinal Study of Australian Children
(LSAC) and show no significant relationship between child support receipt and labour
force participation but some evidence of high levels of child support being associated with
working fewer hours. More broadly, Walter et al. (2010) use one wave of HILDA data
and show that receiving more child support is associated with better housing conditions,
and, based on in-depth interviews with parents who receive child support, Natalier (2012)
discusses that the unreliability of child support payments means that lone mothers rarely
see child support as contributing to their housing costs. Whilst this body of descriptive
and correlational research gives background information about the state of child support
in Australia, no empirical studies have acknowledged and attempted to correct for the
potential endogeneity of the amount of child support received and the outcome in question.
This study therefore contributes to an important expansion of the understanding of the
effects of child support outside of the United States, particularly in regimes with a more
generous welfare system, as well as providing the first causal analysis of the labour market
effects of child support in Australia.
3 Child support in Australia
Before 1988, child support in Australia was determined by the courts. In 1988 and 1999,
legislation was introduced to transfer responsibility for the calculation of child support
amounts and for the enforcement and collection of child support to the newly estab-
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lished Child Support Agency (CSA).3 The legislation addressed concerns that the level of
court-ordered child maintenance was insufficient and that collection and enforcement were
ineffective (Department of Social Services 2013). This was related to a growing concern
about the feminization of poverty in Australia driven by the poor circumstances of lone
parents, and the resultant burden on goverenment finances (Cook et al. 2011).
The level of child support payable is determined by an administrative formula, with
the payer’s transfer being determined by their income, the proportion of that income
they would be deemed to contribute to the costs of raising their children in an intact
relationship, an allowance for their self-support, and the payee’s income above a disre-
gard level. The initial scheme remained in place without substantial changes until 2006
when, in response to the findings of the Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support, a series
of reforms were implemented over a three year period. The reforms incorporated four
ideas: the equal treatment of income from both parents; a more accurate reflection of the
costs of raising children; recognition of contributions through care and contact; and equal
treatment of second families (Department of Social Services 2013). This was achieved by
recognising in-kind payments (for example payment of school fees), reducing the maxi-
mum and increasing the minimum child support payment, increased efforts to collect and
enforce payments, and a new formula.
The new formula was constructed to treat income from both parents equally and to
allocate the costs of raising children according to the proportion of care provided. More-
over, the proportion of income assumed to be allocated to raising children was changed
from a fixed percentage, regardless of income level and age of children, to a proportion
that declines as the relevant combined income increases and increases with the age of the
children (Smyth and Henman 2010). As the formula changed along a number of dimen-
sions, this did not result in an unambiguous gain or loss for either paying or receiving
parents. Smyth and Henman (2010) show that, assuming no changes in behaviour, 49%
of receiving parents were expected to receive less child support under the new formula,
whilst 37% were expected to receive more. Amongst paying parents, 51% were expected
to pay less, and 33% to pay more.
There is no requirement for separated parents to seek an administrative assessment
of child support liability under the Scheme, and private agreements can be made and
enforced at levels above or below the formula amount. However, those in receipt of
more than the base level of Family Tax Benefit (FTB) Part A are required to “take
reasonable action to obtain child support”. Lodging an application for assessment under
the child support formula and implementing at least the assessed child support transfer
3The Child Support Agency functions were incorporated into the Department for Human Services
(DHS) in 2011.
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either privately or via the CSA satisfies this requirement (Commonwealth of Australia
2009). This provides strong encouragement for the majority of receiving parents to engage
with the Child Support Scheme: in 2003, the CSA estimated that 85-90% of potentially
eligible separated parents make use of the Scheme (Standing Committee on Family and
Community Affairs 2003). Of those separated parents managing their cases through the
CSA in 2008-09, 87% used the formula amount (Commonwealth of Australia 2009).
Once an amount has been set, parents can opt to make transfers privately (Private
Collect) or to use the Child Support Collect system. Under Child Support Collect, the
paying parent transfers funds to the CSA, which are then passed on to the receiving parent.
In the event that the paying parent does not make the transfer, the CSA has the power
to garnish wages and government transfer payments. If a debt accumulates, the CSA
can also garnish tax refunds, undertake litigation, and apply for Departure Prohibition
Orders. In 2011-12, 46% of child support cases used the Child Support Collect system,
with $1.31 billion transferred.
A child support assessment is valid for a maximum of 15 months, after which it is
reassessed based on the latest tax return information available. Either parent can also
apply for a variation in the child support assessment at any time; the majority of such
applications are due to changes in the income or earning capacity of one of the parents
(Commonwealth of Australia 2009).
The main interaction of child support with the welfare system is through FTB Part A
and the Maintenance Income Test. FTB Part A is a payment per child per fortnight. As
of 2014-15, the base level (payable to all parents) was $56.70 per child, with a maximum
of $230.02 for a child aged over 13. The maximum rate was received by those with family
taxable income below $50,151. As mentioned above, separated parents must demonstrate
reasonable action to obtain child support to be entitled to a payment above the base
level: with the median income of receiving parents in the child support system being
under $27,000 in 2008-09, the majority of lone parents have an incentive to apply for a
child support assessment. The Maintenance Income Test means that parents can receive
up to at least $1522.05 per year in child support without any effect on their FTB Part A
payment;4 above this, child support reduces FTB Part A by 50 cents in the dollar until
the base rate of FTB Part A is reached.
When parents opt for Private Collect, the maintenance income test is implemented
assuming that the child support amount is paid in full. In contrast, if Child Support
Collect is used, the actual amount of child support transferred is used for the maintenance
income test: this creates an incentive for women with higher FTB eligibility (and less
4This amount increases by $507.35 for each additional Child Support child.
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reliable payers) to opt for Child Support Collect instead of Private Collect.
Note that child support recipients are likely to be eligible for a number of further
government transfers. In 2008-09, 41% of receiving parents were also receiving Parenting
Payment ($720.30 per fortnight). These additional payments are not affected by the
amount of child support received (although they are included in the parent’s income for
the purposes of calculating the relevant child support payment).
4 Child support and government transfers: theoret-
ical predictions
In the absence of a welfare system that in some way accounts for child support received, a
mother should respond to receiving child support with a pure income effect. In a standard
labour supply framework, this suggests that labour supply should not increase: instead,
consumption and leisure should increase. This explains the common expectation that
mothers receiving child support are less likely to be in employment. However, when child
support receipt interacts with the welfare system (effectively taxing the child support
received), the expected labour supply effects depend on how much of the child support is
taxed away. Figure 1 illustrates how the budget constraint may change and how that can
affect labour supply.5
In all panels of figure 1, the pre-child support budget constraint is OGBX, reflecting
an out of work transfer of OG which is withdrawn as earnings increase up to point B where
all of the benefits have been withdrawn. Panel (a) then assumes that all child support
(OC) passes directly to the receiving parent, shifting the entire budget constraint upwards
to OAB′Y . In this case, any parent choosing the corner solution at point G (ie. not
working) before receiving child support will remain out of the labour force after receiving
child support, choosing point A. No parent would enter the labour force, and no parent
would increase hours worked, as a result of receiving child support.
Panel (c) instead illustrates a system that does not pass through any child support:
there is an effective tax rate of 100% up to the point that all welfare benefits have been
withdrawn. The budget constraint when receiving OC of child support is then OGB′′′Y .
As all of the child support received by a non-working parent is taxed away, there is no
income effect for those who are out of the labour market. Some non-working parents can
become better off by entering the labour market, choosing point Z. So in this case the
5These diagrams are an extension of Hu (1999) which illustrates the 100% effective tax rate scenario
given in panel (c).
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Figure 1: Labour supply effects of child support receipt for different pass through amounts
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receipt of child support actually induces labour force participation, and the receipt of a
higher level of child support would make this more likely.
Panel (b) shows an intermediate case: an effective tax rate of 50% on the amount of
child support received. The budget constraint becomes OA′B′′Y . In this case, a parent
with the wage rate and preferences illustrated will not enter the labour market. As the
effective tax rate falls, the parent is less likely to enter the labour market.
In all cases, a parent who is working before the receipt of child support will never
increase their hours worked: all aggregate labour supply responses predicted by this
standard model operate at the extensive margin.
The Australian welfare and child support system passes through a portion of child sup-
port regardless of transfers received, withdrawing transfers in excess of the maintenance
income threshold at a rate of 50%. In comparison to the United States, this is a high
level of pass through, and so we might expect that labour supply participation responses
to receiving child support would be smaller in Australia than in the United States.
5 Data
Data is drawn from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA)
Survey. This is a longitudinal survey with a broad social and economic scope, with the first
wave collection taking place in 2001 and interviewing 7,682 households. All members of
these original households are classed as Continuing Sample Members (CSMs) and eligible
to be followed. In addition, any children born to a CSM become a CSM. Adult CSMs are
interviewed annually, giving detailed information on income, labour force participation
and household structure.6
Each wave respondents are asked a bank of questions regarding a respondent’s biolog-
ical and adoptive children regardless of coresidence. Where those children are aged under
24, information is sought regarding the location of the other parent and about any finan-
cial support paid or received for the child (including in-kind support).7 For the youngest
child with a parent living elsewhere information is also collected about how much time
the child spends with the other parent, and (from wave 3 onwards) the employment status
of the other parent. It is, however, not possible to link the child support reported to the
6For further information about HILDA see Summerfield et al. (2014).
7In addition, the amount of child support and/or spousal maintenance is requested alongside other
sources of income. Since this amount includes spousal maintenance I choose to use the variable de-
rived from payments specifically related to child expenses. Results using the measure including spousal
maintenance are consistent with those presented below.
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child: if the parent is receiving child support from multiple fathers, only the total amount
received is observed.
My estimation sample consists of women who have a child living with them for at least
50% of the year where the child’s other parent lives elsewhere. Due to my identification
strategy (outlined below), the respondent must also report the employment status of the
non-resident parent in the previous wave, limiting my sample observations to wave four
and later. After dropping observations with missing data, I have a sample of 867 women,
with 3123 total observations. 50% of these women are first seen in the survey where they
already have a resident child with a parent living elsewhere: in these cases there is no
further information about the parent living elsewhere except for that reported by the
respondent.
The outcome variables I examine are the amount of government transfer payments,
market income and gross income received by the household in which the mother lives. I
also examine binary variables indicating if the mother is employed, or is not in the labour
force, and the number of hours worked per week.
Unfortunately there is relatively little information about the children with separated
parents. Unlike other comparable surveys, HILDA only collects detailed information
about those aged 15 and older. This limits the range of outcomes I can examine. In
addition, the children with parents elsewhere and relationship history information of the
responding parent are not linked to each other. The former relationship status and amount
of time passed since relationship breakdown are therefore not certain. HILDA collects
complete marital histories, so it is possible to infer whether the youngest child with a
parent living elsewhere was born in a year in which the mother was married or in the year
immediately following separation. If this is the case, I assume that the reported marriage
is between the child’s biological parents. Information about de facto relationships prior
to 2001 is less complete: the first and the most recent (excluding an ongoing relationship)
are reported. Again, if the youngest child with a parent living elsewhere was born in a
calendar year in which the mother was in a de facto relationship or the year immediately
following relationship breakdown, I assume that the child’s parents were in a de facto
relationship. Where the youngest relevant child’s birth year cannot be placed in either a
marriage or reported de facto relationship I assume that the child’s parents were never in a
cohabiting relationship.8 The reported year of relationship breakdown, or the year of the
child’s birth, is then used to estimate the number of years since relationship breakdown.
Further important control variables for my empirical strategy are indicators for whether
8This will misclassify some de facto parents as no relationship parents – however, characteristics of
the de facto and no relationship mothers are similar, with similar coefficients on both de facto and no
relationship indicators in the analysis below.
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the mother worked before the birth of the youngest child with a parent living elsewhere,
and whether formal maternity leave was taken. These questions are asked only in waves
5, 8 and 11. These responses are linked to the youngest relevant child in that wave, and
distributed across other observations for the same relevant child.
Table 1 gives summary statistics for my estimation sample. 60% of the sample receive
some child support, with the average amount received (conditional on receiving any)
$5,120. The average number of relevant children is 1.68, with the youngest Child Support
child being 9.5 years old, and 57% of mothers were once married to the father of the
youngest CS child. The sample of mothers is aged 39 on average, and was 25 at first
birth. 56% of the women worked before the birth of their youngest CS child, with 18%
taking formal maternity leave. This sample has broadly similar characteristics to the
population of Child Support Agency cases in 2008-09 (the median observation is from
wave 9, collected in 2009), most notably with respect to the taxable income of child
support recipients. Mean personal private income (excluding any income from government
transfers) in the sample is $21,376 (in 2001 Australian dollars), with the CSA population
average at $21,626. Median private income in the sample is $24,959 compared to $26,095
for the population (Commonwealth of Australia 2009). The 2008-09 population average
annual liability was $3,343, compared to $3,061 in the sample, representing the amount
of child support received rather than the child support due.9
The table also sets out the summary statistics by whether the woman reports receiving
some child support or not. Mothers in these categories are similar along a number of
dimensions: there is no significant difference in education and the propensity to be out of
the labour force or to repartner. There is also no significant difference in the distance from
the non-resident father or their prior relationship status. On the other hand, mothers not
receiving any child support have less and older CS children on average, and have former
partners who are less likely to be working full time. They are also more likely to be born
outside of Australia and less likely to have worked before the birth of their youngest CS
child. They are more likely to be working full time and receive less government transfers.
These raw statistics provide an indication that receiving child support is associated with a
lower probability of working full time and higher government transfer receipts. However,
these raw differences do not account for the fact that working full time (and so having
higher market income) can lead to receiving less child support, and that women receiving
a higher level of FTB have a greater incentive to use the administrative system to collect
their child support, perhaps leading to the receipt of a higher proportion of awarded child
support.
9Moreover the geographical distribution by state is similar to that reported for the population of CSA
cases.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
All Some CS No CS
Mean sd. Mean sd. Mean sd.
Receives some child support 0.60 0.49 1 0 0 0
Amount of child support ($000) 3.06 5.03 5.12 5.64 0 0
Number of CS children 1.68 0.86 1.74 0.89 1.59 0.81
Age of youngest CS child 9.53 4.61 9.28 4.62 9.92 4.58
Worked before birth 0.56 0.50 0.57 0.49 0.53 0.50
Took maternity leave 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.37
Distance from father
<10km 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.33 0.47
10-50km 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.32 0.47
>50km 0.35 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.34 0.47
Prior relationship status with father
Married 0.57 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.56 0.50
De facto 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.42
No relationship 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.40 0.22 0.41
Lagged father’s employment status
Employed full time 0.74 0.44 0.80 0.40 0.65 0.48
Employed part time 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.25 0.10 0.30
Unemployed 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22 0.08 0.28
Not in labour force 0.11 0.32 0.08 0.28 0.16 0.37
Not working 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.34 0.24 0.43
Years since breakdown 6.57 4.16 6.46 4.05 6.75 4.31
Age 39.32 8.83 38.56 8.31 40.45 9.45
Age at first birth 24.87 5.55 24.93 5.56 24.79 5.54
Number of resident children 1.87 0.98 1.95 1.01 1.76 0.92
Current partner 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.35 0.48
Country of birth
Australia 0.84 0.36 0.87 0.34 0.81 0.39
Overseas (English speaking) 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.31
Overseas (other) 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.28
Education
Less than year 12 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47
Year 12 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.34
Further education 0.35 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.33 0.47
Higher education 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.41
Employment status
Not in labour force 0.27 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.45
Full time 0.33 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.37 0.48
Part time 0.35 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.31 0.46
Hours worked 21.21 18.22 20.54 17.76 22.22 18.85
Household income sources
Government transfers ($000) 13.66 10.88 13.97 10.68 13.20 11.18
Market income ($000) 45.02 49.62 44.35 49.45 46.00 49.88
Gross income ($000) 62.22 44.68 63.86 44.62 59.79 44.67
Observations 3123 1868 1255
Individuals 867 496 615
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6 Empirical strategy
The aim of this paper is to estimate the effect of receiving a higher level of child support
on women’s household income, labour force participation, and household consumption
patterns. The baseline model estimated is as follows:
Yi = θCSi + βXi + ei (1)
where Yi is the outcome of interest, CSi is either an indicator for the receipt of any child
support or the reported amount of child support received, Xi is a vector of individual
characteristics of the mother and εi is an error term which is clustered at the individual
level. I include a set of wave, state and remoteness area indicators.
Estimating this model with OLS would provide an unbiased and consistent causal
estimate of the effect of additional child support on the outcome if the receipt of child
support (CSi) is independent of and uncorrelated with the error term. Since it is likely
that, for example, more highly educated mothers receive less government transfers on
average, have higher income former partners and so receive more child support, it is
important to include these observable characteristics in the vector of control variables
Xi. This will reduce the correlation between child support receipt and the error term,
reducing the likelihood of an inconsistent estimate.
It is likely that controlling for observable characteristics is not sufficient to eliminate
this correlation. There may be unobservable characteristics that affect both child support
receipt and labour market and consumption decisions. Reverse causality is also present
for two reasons: after the 2006-08 reforms, as a mother’s income increases, the amount
of child support she receives will fall due to the child support formula. Second, mothers
receiving more than the base level of FTB are required to have an administrative child
support assessment. The mother is also encouraged to use the Child Support Collect
system so that any underpayment of child support is accounted for in the calculation
of FTB. This might lead to a positive correlation between child support received and
government transfers received. Failing to account for these mechanisms will produce an
inconsistent estimate of θ. In the case of the receipt of government transfers, θ will be
higher than the true casual estimate, whereas for labour income it will be lower.
A further concern is that the care of the child support child is determined partly by
details of the benefits system. For example, post-2008 a non-resident parent can claim a
share of Family Tax Benefit if they care for the child for at least 35% of the time. However,
survey evidence suggests that these welfare system details are not widely known amongst
13
this population, and indeed relevant parents who believe they understand the interaction
of child support, care, and the welfare system, in fact do not (Smyth et al. 2012). I
therefore treat the mother’s proportion of care as independently determined (conditional
on individual characteristics).
To avoid the bias driven from reverse causality, I adopt an instrumental variables (IV)
approach. A valid instrument is correlated with the endogenous variable (the amount of
child support received), but is uncorrelated with the error term in equation 1 above: the
only way in which it affects the outcome, conditional on individual characteristics Xi, is
through the endogenous variable. If we assume that mothers make their labour market
and consumption decisions independently of those of the non-resident parent, then the
lagged employment status of the non-resident parent is a candidate instrument. As the
non-resident parent’s employment status changes, the amount of child support received
by the mother will also change at the next reassessment. Hence, when father becomes
unemployed or withdraws from the labour force more broadly, the child support received
by the mother is expected to fall in the future – and not due to any behaviour change
or characteristic of the mother. The strength of this relationship can be tested, and it
is shown below that lagged father’s employment status is a strong predictor of receiving
any child support, and the amount of child support received.
The second assumption needed for this IV approach to be valid is that lagged father’s
employment status is uncorrelated with the error term in equation 1 above. There are a
number of concerns about this assumption. Most importantly, the father’s characteristics
are likely to be correlated with those of the mother. First, positive assortative matching
means that a child’s father’s employment status will be correlated with their mother’s
employment status, as individual characteristics including age and education are corre-
lated. It is therefore important to control for these individual characteristics. Whilst my
data do not allow me to control for the characteristics of the father, I am able to control
for the mother’s characteristics, which, via assortative matching, will capture the father’s
characteristics. Second, the mother and father may be located in the same local area, and
so be subject to the same local labour markets. Including state unemployment and par-
ticipation rates by gender as control variables contributes some confidence that this does
not violate the excludability assumption. I also include a set of indicators for the decile
of the Index of Economic Resources of the local area: this is an indicator constructed by
the Australian Bureau of Statistics to capture financial aspects of relative socio-economic
advantage and disadvantage in local areas containing 200-800 people. The crucial as-
sumption is that, conditional on the vector Xi, father’s employment status is unrelated
to the outcome variable except via its effect on child support receipt. Section 8 presents
results that relax this assumption.
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I implement the IV approach using two stage least squares. The first stage estimation
involves estimating the probability of receiving child support, and the level of reported
child support:
CSi = γES
f
i + δXi + ηi (2)
The second stage then takes the predicted value of CSi from the first stage and uses them
in place of the reported level: this is the relevant child support variable purged of the
component that is correlated with the error term.
Yi = θ
′ĈSi + σXi + εi (3)
In all cases, standard errors are clustered at the individual level to account for multiple
observations per mother.
7 Results
7.1 Determining the level of child support
Columns 1 and 3 of table 2 shows results of the estimation of the first stage of the IV
specification (equation 2) for the binary variable of receiving any child support, and the
continuous variable of the amount of child support received (when positive). The first row
shows the instrument: a binary variable equal to one if the non-resident father was not
employed at the previous survey. The probability of receiving any child support is 16.4
percentage points lower if the father was not working, and conditional on receiving some
child support, an out of work father pays $3,008 less per year than a father working full
or part time. In this full sample, the out of work variable is statistically significant with
an F-statistic of 28.3 in the binary regression and 66.3 in the level regression. These F-
statistics are sufficiently high to suggest no weak instrument problem. More broadly, child
support is more likely to be received and is higher when the mother has more children
eligible for child support, when the mother has primary or above primary care (70-100%
of the time) and where the parents were once married. When the mother was born in
Australia, has a higher age at first birth, moved out of home when aged 20 or over, and
does not live in a very remote area, child support receipt is higher.
Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 introduce a number of additional regressors that are not included
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Table 2: Predicting child support receipt: first stage regressions
Any child support Amount of child support, $000
All Pre-2008 2008 on All Pre-2008 2008 on
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Father not employed last period -0.164∗ -0.134∗ -0.170∗ -3.008∗ -3.473∗ -3.090∗
(0.031) (0.044) (0.038) (0.369) (0.477) (0.486)
Number of CS children 0.028 0.085 -0.028 1.640∗ 0.604 1.792∗
(0.031) (0.053) (0.038) (0.421) (0.553) (0.510)
Age youngest CS child -0.000 0.004 -0.000 0.211+ 0.289∗ 0.253+
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.126) (0.138) (0.149)
Proportion of care category
Primary 0.255∗ 0.367∗ 0.213∗ 1.392∗ 2.948∗ 0.781
(0.044) (0.068) (0.050) (0.566) (0.772) (0.566)
Above primary 0.224∗ 0.331∗ 0.182∗ 0.766 1.385+ 0.658
(0.045) (0.069) (0.050) (0.571) (0.715) (0.579)
Former relationship status (with father of youngest CS child)
De facto -0.045 -0.078 -0.029 -1.236∗ -1.184∗ -1.603∗
(0.038) (0.051) (0.046) (0.474) (0.592) (0.512)
No relationship -0.047 -0.122∗ -0.023 -0.794 -0.772 -1.413∗
(0.041) (0.054) (0.050) (0.623) (0.711) (0.697)
Years since breakdown 0.007 0.004 0.009 -0.186∗ -0.204∗ -0.151
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.087) (0.098) (0.108)
Worked before birth 0.033 0.069 0.037 -0.236 0.563 0.007
(0.031) (0.043) (0.037) (0.457) (0.671) (0.495)
Formal maternity leave 0.020 0.022 0.079 -0.405 -0.450 0.277
(0.041) (0.054) (0.048) (0.614) (0.824) (0.738)
New partner -0.024 -0.091∗ -1.933∗ -1.130∗
(0.042) (0.038) (0.542) (0.475)
Labour income ($000) -0.001 -0.002∗ -0.015 -0.033+
(0.001) (0.001) (0.018) (0.017)
Mother’s employment status
Part time 0.030 0.058 0.816 0.600
(0.049) (0.037) (0.581) (0.450)
Unemployed 0.094 -0.095 -0.031 0.049
(0.080) (0.067) (0.798) (0.696)
Not in LF (marginal) -0.013 0.015 0.450 0.674
(0.068) (0.058) (0.849) (0.632)
Not in LF 0.001 -0.022 -0.362 2.322∗
(0.063) (0.055) (0.823) (0.685)
Observations 3123 1198 1925 1868 724 1144
Individuals 867 496 679 615 347 459
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
Other controls: age, age squared, total number of children in mother’s household, mother’s education,
age at first birth, age left home, indicator for parents ever divorced, distance from father, state
unemployment and participation rates by sex, wave indicators, state indicators, remoteness area
indicators, indicators for decile of Index of Economic Resources of local area
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in the subsequent analysis, but which highlight the effect of the 2006-08 reforms. Columns
2 and 5 restrict attention to observations before 2008, and columns 3 and 6 to observations
from 2008 onwards when the new formula was introduced. In the later time period, a
higher level of labour income is associated with a lower level of child support receipt,
which is consistent with the inclusion of recipient income in the child support formula. In
addition, being out of the labour force is associated with a higher level of child support in
the later period. This is evidence of the direct effects of the change in the child support
formula – that is the inclusion of the resident parent’s income in the formula – on the
level of child support.
7.2 Household income sources
I first examine the effect of the amount of child support on household income, considering
government transfer income, market income (including business and labour income) and
gross household income. To complement these continuous measures, I also examine binary
outcome variables for employment status (not in the labour force, employed, employed
full time and employed part time), as well as the number of hours worked. Results are
also presented for different time periods, different educational groups, different care levels
and the presence of a new partner.
Tables 3 to 5 show the results for the components of household income examined for
a number of different specifications. Columns 1-4 in each table present results for a bi-
nary indicator of the receipt of any positive amount of child support, with columns 5-8
presenting results for the continuous measure of child support conditional on any receipt.
Columns 1 and 5 show results for the base OLS specification (not accounting for the antic-
ipated endogeneity of child support and household income variables), controlling for the
observable characteristics of the mother, the proportion of time the mother cares for the
child and a set of time indicators. Columns 2 and 6 add a set of location indicators (state,
remoteness area and area decile of socioeconomic disadvantage), male and female state
unemployment and participation rates, indicators for the mother’s employment status
and maternity leave before/at the birth of the youngest Child Support child, an indicator
for whether the parents were ever married and the number of years since the relationship
broke down. These additional variables proxy for the unobserved characteristics of the
child’s father and the parental relationship before breakdown. Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8
present comparable instrumental variables results using the lag of the father’s employ-
ment status as the instrument for the receipt of any child support or the amount of child
support received.
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Table 3: Effect of child support receipt on level of government transfers received
Receives any child support Level of child support received ($000)
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Child support -0.244 0.385 -17.231∗ -8.503∗ -0.051 0.028 -0.868∗ -0.449+
(0.478) (0.410) (4.204) (3.670) (0.052) (0.045) (0.226) (0.254)
No. of CS children 3.691∗ 2.673∗ 4.139∗ 2.999∗ 3.841∗ 2.694∗ 5.396∗ 3.527∗
(0.736) (0.610) (0.945) (0.704) (0.854) (0.754) (1.050) (0.907)
Age youngest CS child -0.389∗ -0.242+ -0.350∗ -0.222 -0.411∗ -0.174 -0.359∗ -0.054
(0.110) (0.124) (0.140) (0.140) (0.154) (0.161) (0.173) (0.182)
Proportion of care category
Primary 2.531∗ 1.911∗ 6.809∗ 4.163∗ 2.217+ 1.687+ 3.180∗ 2.381∗
(0.896) (0.717) (1.539) (1.277) (1.169) (0.865) (1.359) (0.977)
Above primary 2.885∗ 2.219∗ 6.197∗ 4.090∗ 2.595∗ 2.062∗ 2.779∗ 2.348∗
(0.885) (0.695) (1.386) (1.164) (1.181) (0.871) (1.347) (0.927)
Years since breakdown -0.223∗ -0.174+ -0.279∗ -0.381∗
(0.090) (0.105) (0.124) (0.145)
Worked before birth -3.642∗ -3.216∗ -2.892∗ -2.866∗
(0.635) (0.724) (0.794) (0.830)
Maternity leave -2.368∗ -2.150∗ -2.635∗ -2.763∗
(0.614) (0.749) (0.770) (0.830)
Former relationship status (with father of youngest CS child)
De facto 1.356+ 0.905 1.741∗ 1.101
(0.698) (0.803) (0.867) (0.987)
No relationship 2.314∗ 1.783+ 3.874∗ 3.456∗
(0.827) (0.995) (1.072) (1.160)
Wave indicators 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
State indicators 4 4 4 4
Remoteness indicators 4 4 4 4
Unemployment rates 4 4 4 4
IER decile 4 4 4 4
Observations 3123 3123 3123 3123 1868 1868 1868 1868
Individuals 867 867 867 867 615 615 615 615
F statistic 34.912 28.326 100.026 66.289
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
Other controls (columns 1, 3, 5 and 7): age, age squared, total number of children in mother’s household,
mother’s education, country of birth. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 also control for: age at first birth , age left
home, indicator for parents ever divorced, distance from father.
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Table 3 shows results for the amount of government transfers received. The first four
columns show OLS and IV results for the effect of receiving any child support on the level
of transfers received. OLS estimates are imprecise and do not reveal a correlation between
receiving some child support and the amount of government transfers received, even with
a rich set of controls. Columns 3 and 4 show comparable IV estimates: receiving any child
support leads to a reduction in the amount of government transfers received. Using the
full set of control variables which account for the common environment of the mother and
father reduces the magnitude of this effect, suggesting that receiving any child support
leads to receiving $8,503 less in government transfers, with the average level of receipt in
the sample at $13,660. Columns 5-8 show estimates for the effect of the amount of child
support received, conditional on receiving any child support. Again, the OLS estimates
show no significant effect of the amount of child support received, but the IV estimates
show a statistically significant negative effect: for every dollar of child support received
(conditional on receiving any child support), government transfers fall by 45 cents. The
reduction in government transfer receipt at the extensive and intensive margin of child
support receipt reflects two mechanisms: first, the mechanical reduction in FTB (50 cents
in the dollar for child support in excess of $1500), and second the changes in behaviour
described in section 7.3 below.
Table 4 presents similar results for the amount of household market income. This
includes income from labour, business, investments and private pensions. OLS results
show little relationship between receiving any child support and market income, but
conditional on receipt, higher levels of child support are negatively correlated with market
income: this reflects the concern that child support has an income effect, discouraging
labour supply and reducing market income for receiving parents. Controlling for the
mother’s work history is important for finding this negative correlation as it strongly
predicts current employment status and market income, and mothers who worked before
the birth of the child have, on average, more child support. IV estimates, on the other
hand, suggest that the receipt of child support increases the amount of household market
income. With a full set of controls, receiving any child support is associated with an
increase in household income of $43,329 (with average market income in the sample at
$45,020). On the intensive margin, an extra dollar of child support receipt leads to an
additional $2.62 of household market income.
The effect on gross household income is shown in table 5. With no behavioural changes,
a one for one increase in household income would be expected, and receiving any child
support would be associated with an increase equal to the average amount of child support
received. However, changes in labour market participation and benefit receipt will affect
the overall level of household income, as well as any changes in living arrangements. Table
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Table 4: Effect of child support receipt on level of household market income
Receives any child support Level of child support received ($000)
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Child support 0.160 -2.720 85.654∗ 43.329∗ -0.158 -0.562∗ 4.709∗ 2.617∗
(2.413) (1.988) (19.411) (15.226) (0.269) (0.261) (0.992) (0.994)
No. of CS children -13.880∗ -8.701∗ -16.138∗ -10.389∗ -11.048∗ -5.396+ -20.309∗ -10.940∗
(3.339) (2.799) (4.714) (3.425) (3.623) (3.195) (4.829) (3.897)
Age youngest CS child 2.460∗ 0.866 2.264∗ 0.761 3.435∗ 1.661∗ 3.123∗ 0.865
(0.515) (0.571) (0.689) (0.675) (0.621) (0.715) (0.790) (0.878)
Proportion of care category
Primary -5.901 -2.885 -27.433∗ -14.548∗ -4.274 -1.863 -10.007 -6.482
(4.672) (3.848) (7.588) (5.957) (6.026) (4.335) (7.035) (4.778)
Above primary -7.086 -4.059 -23.752∗ -13.751∗ -4.973 -2.127 -6.067 -4.025
(4.678) (3.895) (6.992) (5.607) (6.177) (4.696) (7.028) (4.819)
Years since breakdown 1.773∗ 1.518∗ 1.831∗ 2.511∗
(0.472) (0.528) (0.594) (0.720)
Worked before birth 17.347∗ 15.141∗ 17.353∗ 17.178∗
(3.200) (3.459) (4.059) (4.245)
Maternity leave 6.917+ 5.791 2.249 3.102
(4.133) (4.733) (4.574) (4.975)
Former relationship status (with father of youngest CS child)
De facto -1.855 0.483 -9.042+ -4.781
(4.623) (5.265) (5.115) (5.789)
No relationship -12.386∗ -9.632∗ -17.452∗ -14.671∗
(3.767) (4.498) (4.418) (5.269)
Wave indicators 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
State indicators 4 4 4 4
Remoteness indicators 4 4 4 4
Unemployment rates 4 4 4 4
IER decile 4 4 4 4
Observations 3123 3123 3123 3123 1868 1868 1868 1868
Individuals 867 867 867 867 615 615 615 615
F statistic 34.912 28.326 100.026 66.289
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
Other controls (columns 1, 3, 5 and 7): age, age squared, total number of children in mother’s household,
mother’s education, country of birth. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 also control for: age at first birth , age left home,
indicator for parents ever divorced, distance from father.
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Table 5: Effect of child support receipt on level of household income
Receives any child support Level of child support received ($000)
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Child support 4.817∗ 2.435 83.880∗ 48.923∗ 0.860∗ 0.498∗ 4.827∗ 3.050∗
(2.152) (1.806) (17.930) (14.552) (0.223) (0.231) (0.856) (0.869)
No. of CS children -8.756∗ -4.594+ -10.844∗ -6.298∗ -7.100∗ -2.732 -14.648∗ -7.182∗
(2.841) (2.451) (4.196) (3.114) (2.980) (2.723) (3.978) (3.281)
Age youngest CS child 2.191∗ 0.894+ 2.010∗ 0.788 3.141∗ 1.614∗ 2.887∗ 0.974
(0.459) (0.509) (0.616) (0.608) (0.533) (0.630) (0.653) (0.736)
Proportion of care category
Primary -2.027 0.513 -21.939∗ -11.262∗ -1.281 0.584 -5.954 -3.123
(4.089) (3.464) (6.894) (5.557) (5.227) (3.940) (5.968) (4.201)
Above primary -3.843 -1.327 -19.256∗ -11.112∗ -1.973 0.320 -2.864 -1.204
(4.088) (3.554) (6.375) (5.309) (5.337) (4.316) (5.950) (4.313)
Years since breakdown 1.385∗ 1.126∗ 1.491∗ 2.037∗
(0.424) (0.481) (0.536) (0.626)
Worked before birth 13.834∗ 11.607∗ 14.615∗ 14.474∗
(2.857) (3.120) (3.663) (3.768)
Maternity leave 4.780 3.643 0.353 1.038
(3.723) (4.315) (4.099) (4.334)
Former relationship status (with father of youngest CS child)
De facto -1.225 1.136 -6.993 -3.574
(4.225) (4.924) (4.605) (5.144)
No relationship -10.844∗ -8.063∗ -13.519∗ -11.287∗
(3.338) (4.088) (3.875) (4.521)
Wave indicators 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
State indicators 4 4 4 4
Remoteness indicators 4 4 4 4
Unemployment rates 4 4 4 4
IER decile 4 4 4 4
Observations 3123 3123 3123 3123 1868 1868 1868 1868
Individuals 867 867 867 867 615 615 615 615
F statistic 34.912 28.326 100.026 66.289
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
Other controls (columns 1, 3, 5 and 7): age, age squared, total number of children in mother’s household,
mother’s education, country of birth. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 also control for: age at first birth , age left home,
indicator for parents ever divorced, distance from father.
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5 shows results for the absolute level of household income. OLS results are consistent
with household income increasing by the average amount of child support received if
child support is received, and with one dollar of child support leading to a one dollar
increase in household income. The IV results, however, reject this hypothesis, finding
that household income increases by more than what would be expected in the absence of
behavioural changes. With the full set of controls, receiving any child support leads to
household income increasing by $48,923, reflecting the $5,120 of child support payments
alongside the reduction in government transfer receipt and increase in market income.10
Each dollar of child support received is associated with an increase in household income
of $3.05, significantly greater than one.
These results for household income suggest that receiving any child support reduces
reliance on government transfers and increases the market income of payee mothers, and
conditional on receiving any child support, as the amount increases household market
income increases and gross income increases by more than the amount of child support
received.
7.3 Labour market activity
Table 6 shows results for a number of measures of labour market activity. In all cases, the
full set of control variables are included. OLS and IV estimates are presented. The first
four lines of the table show the effects of any child support receipt and conditional-on-
positive levels of child support received on binary indicators for being not in the labour
force, employed, employed full time, and employed part time. OLS estimates suggest
that receiving any child support is associated with a lower chance of being employed
full time and a higher chance of being employed part time. However, this may reflect
reverse causality: women working full time have higher incomes and so are entitled to
less child support. Conditional on receiving some child support, an additional dollar is
associated with a 0.4 percentage point increase in the probability of being out of the
labour force and a 0.6 percentage point reduction in the probability of working full time.
IV results present a different picture: receiving any child support leads to mothers being
23 percentage points more likely to be working full time and no effect on the probability
of working part time. Conditional on receiving child support, receiving an additional
$1000 leads to being 2.9 percentage points less likely to be out of the labour force, 3.1
percentage points more likely to be employed, and 2.3 percentage points more likely to
be working full time. What is striking about these results is that the increase in labour
10There is some additional variation in household income from other private transfers, including spousal
maintenance payments and those received by other members of the household, and also from any windfall
payments received.
22
market activity caused by the receipt of child support is via full time employment, not
part time employment.
Analysis of usual hours worked per week in the fifth line of table 6 reinforces this
result. The OLS result in column 3 corresponds to the results of Taylor and Gray (2010),
finding that a higher level of child support receipt is associated with working fewer hours.
However, IV results contradict this and suggest that the OLS results are contaminated
with reverse causality: women working more hours have higher income and so receive
less child support. Receiving any child support is associated with working an additional
12.9 hours per week, and each additional $1000 received leads to an additional 1.4 hours
worked.
Table 6: Effect of child support receipt on labour market activity
Any child support Amount ($000) Sample
OLS IV OLS IV average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Not in labour force -0.006 -0.260 0.004+ -0.029∗ 0.274
(0.018) (0.164) (0.002) (0.013)
Employed 0.009 0.236 -0.004 0.031∗ 0.672
(0.019) (0.159) (0.002) (0.012)
Full time -0.048∗ 0.233∗ -0.006∗ 0.023∗ 0.327
(0.020) (0.153) (0.002) (0.010)
Part time 0.057∗ 0.003 0.002 0.017 0.345
(0.022) (0.183) (0.003) (0.013)
Hours worked -0.965 12.936∗ -0.201∗ 1.381∗ 21.214
(0.715) (5.721) (0.087) (0.377)
Observations 3123 3123 1868 1868
Individuals 867 867 615 615
F statistic 28.326 66.289
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
Other controls as in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) of tables 2-5.
7.4 Results for different population groups
Tables 7 to 10 show results in various population sub-groups. First, table 7 shows results
split by whether the observation is before or after the 2008 changes to the child support
formula. Within these groups, instrument strength becomes weaker and so estimates
are less precise. Heterogeneity between the two periods is concentrated in the response of
government transfers: a significant negative effect of child support on government transfers
only occurs in the pre-reform period, with significant market income responses in both
23
periods. The larger effect on government transfers in the pre-reform period reflects the
larger labour supply responses at the extensive margin.
Table 8 splits the sample into low (Year 12 and below) and higher education groups.
It is expected that women with lower education are likely to be receiving higher levels
of government transfers, and therefore have a greater scope for government transfers
to respond. This is confirmed by the analysis: a significant effect of the amount of
child support on government transfer receipt is only seen in the lower education group,
and market income and employment responses are significantly stronger in this group,
particularly on the intensive margin. There is evidence that more highly educated women
respond in terms of increased hours worked and a move into full time work. In contrast,
mothers with lower education respond by moving into part time work.
In table 9 I split the sample by the presence of a new partner. In most cases, women
who have repartnered will have less access to welfare benefits and so are far less likely to
have a positive labour supply response to receiving child support. As expected, the full
set of responses are significant in the lone parent sample, with little significance except for
at the gross household income level for women who have repartnered. For lone mothers,
an additional $1000 of child support received leads to a 4.0 percentage point reduction
of being out of the labour force, and a 2.7 percentage point increase in the probability of
being employed full time. The amount of government transfers falls by $637 and market
income increases by $2269, leading to an increase in gross household income for lone
mothers in excess of the amount of child support received.
One possible concern for these results is that there is joint decision making between
the mother and father in choosing labour supply. To address this I present results splitting
the sample into mothers with below 85% of care (shared care, or primary care) and those
with ‘above primary’ care. 56% of the sample has above primary care, and over half of
these mothers have care of the child for 100% of the time (the child spends no nights with
their father). It is far less likely that mothers with high levels of care for the child are
making joint decisions about labour supply with the father of the child, as the father is
not spending time in childcare. Table 10 shows that government transfer and household
income effects are stronger amongst mothers with above primary care, and that labour
supply effects are smaller and less statistically significant for mothers with lower levels
of care. In particular, the increase in full time employment as a result of receiving child
support is only significant for high care proportion mothers, as are the effects on hours
worked. One separate conclusion from this analysis is that for mothers with less than 85%
care of their youngest child support child, there is an increase in part time employment
when child support is received or increases.
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Table 7: Effect of child support on income and labour supply: pre- and post-reform
Pre-2008 2008 onwards
Any CS Amount ($000) Average Any CS Amount ($000) Average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gov. transfers -10.002 -0.835∗ 13.232 -7.287 -0.105 13.927
(6.091) (0.316) (4.368) (0.326)
Market income 60.566 3.424∗ 39.705 37.803+ 2.230+ 48.320
(29.542) (1.186) (17.390) (1.296)
Gross income 68.213∗ 3.542∗ 56.734 43.020∗ 2.935∗ 65.641
(29.626) (1.025) (16.369) (1.139)
Not in labour force -0.438 -0.041∗ 0.318 -0.232 -0.024 0.247
(0.331) (0.016) (0.183) (0.016)
Employed 0.189 0.036∗ 0.625 0.260 0.030+ 0.721
(0.325) (0.015) (0.182) (0.015)
Full time 0.209 0.033∗ 0.280 0.223 0.017 0.356
(0.288) (0.013) (0.171) (0.013)
Part time -0.020 -0.003 0.346 0.037 0.013 0.345
(0.322) (0.017) (0.208) (0.017)
Hours 9.968 1.544∗ 19.176 14.043∗ 1.354∗ 22.482
(11.311) (0.455) (6.580) (0.536)
Observations 1198 724 1925 1144
Individuals 496 347 679 459
F statistic 9.059 48.575 20.978 39.787
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
Other controls as in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) of tables 2-5.
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Table 8: Effect of child support on income and labour supply: by education group
Low education High education
Any CS Amount ($000) Average Any CS Amount ($000) Average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gov. transfers -8.061 -1.051∗ 16.290 -6.400 -0.031 11.487
(5.022) (0.484) (4.825) (0.265)
Market income 35.215+ 4.831∗ 35.325 39.331 0.999 53.022
(19.124) (1.986) (22.901) (1.125)
Gross income 36.164∗ 4.592∗ 54.829 51.440∗ 1.918+ 68.336
(18.038) (1.770) (22.466) (0.979)
Not in labour force -0.206 -0.032 0.398 -0.242 -0.026+ 0.172
(0.236) (0.025) (0.237) (0.014)
Employed 0.214 0.045+ 0.531 0.177 0.019 0.788
(0.233) (0.024) (0.220) (0.013)
Full time -0.033 0.003 0.224 0.545∗ 0.033∗ 0.412
(0.159) (0.015) (0.272) (0.013)
Part time 0.247 0.042+ 0.308 -0.368 -0.015 0.376
(0.243) (0.024) (0.292) (0.015)
Hours 6.817 1.303∗ 15.685 18.252∗ 1.298∗ 25.782
(6.987) (0.703) (9.363) (0.457)
Observations 1413 845 1710 1023
Individuals 426 307 490 341
F statistic 15.997 28.614 12.181 44.211
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
Other controls as in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) of tables 2-5.
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Table 9: Effect of child support on income and labour supply: by partner status
Lone parent New partner
Any CS Amount ($000) Average Any CS Amount ($000) Average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gov. transfers -7.725∗ -0.637∗ 15.917 -10.647+ 0.224 9.317
(3.668) (0.266) (5.588) (0.417)
Market income 26.159∗ 2.269∗ 28.284 62.937+ 1.948 77.209
(11.382) (0.822) (25.062) (1.611)
Gross income 31.028∗ 2.502∗ 48.021 66.932∗ 3.077∗ 89.553
(11.212) (0.756) (24.433) (1.379)
Not in labour force -0.384∗ -0.040∗ 0.279 0.032 -0.008 0.264
(0.193) (0.015) (0.244) (0.024)
Employed 0.284 0.038∗ 0.661 0.042 0.002 0.692
(0.180) (0.014) (0.246) (0.021)
Full time 0.274 0.027∗ 0.322 0.260 0.016 0.335
(0.176) (0.012) (0.241) (0.018)
Part time 0.010 0.011 0.339 -0.218 -0.014 0.357
(0.216) (0.015) (0.314) (0.024)
Hours 15.843∗ 1.773∗ 21.019 7.071 0.335 21.589
(6.959) (0.492) (8.006) (0.711)
Observations 2055 1239 1068 629
Individuals 644 456 345 242
F statistic 21.707 36.693 12.587 32.772
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
Other controls as in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) of tables 2-5.
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Table 10: Effect of child support on income and labour supply: by proportion of care
Less than 85% Above Primary (¿85%)
Any CS Amount ($000) Average Any CS Amount ($000) Average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gov. transfers -2.317 -0.229 13.082 -9.726+ -0.275 14.106
(2.907) (0.498) (5.327) (0.233)
Market income 29.316∗ 1.492 46.628 29.977 1.768∗ 43.772
(13.129) (1.873) (19.407) (0.899)
Gross income 35.760∗ 2.058 63.609 39.700∗ 2.447∗ 61.158
(12.234) (1.611) (18.523) (0.812)
Not in labour force -0.186 -0.036 0.227 -0.273 -0.021+ 0.310
(0.181) (0.032) (0.225) (0.011)
Employed 0.311+ 0.050 0.717 0.151 0.023∗ 0.637
(0.177) (0.032) (0.213) (0.010)
Full time -0.040 -0.011 0.329 0.313 0.023∗ 0.325
(0.140) (0.020) (0.221) (0.009)
Part time 0.351+ 0.061∗ 0.388 -0.161 0.000 0.312
(0.185) (0.032) (0.267) (0.012)
Hours 7.655 1.038 22.382 14.136+ 1.180∗ 20.314
(6.075) (0.931) (7.790) (0.324)
Observations 1359 824 1764 1044
Individuals 483 328 638 437
F statistic 28.830 21.902 15.262 67.105
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
Other controls as in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) of tables 2-5.
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8 Robustness check
As outlined in section 6, one concern with these results is that the common characteristics
and environment of the mother and father could affect the employment status of both
parents, and that the vector of characteristics in Xi is not sufficient to control for this. To
provide a robustness check for the results reported above, I use the Imperfect Instrumental
Variables approach of Nevo and Rosen (2012) to relax the excludability assumption. This
allows for some correlation between the father’s employment status and the structural
error term, and gives an interval estimation for the parameter of interest.
Nevo and Rosen (2012) propose an approach that substitutes the assumption that the
instrument is (conditionally) uncorrelated with the structural error term (in equation 1
above), with the assumption that the correlation is smaller in absolute terms than the
correlation between the endogenous variable (child support receipt) and the structural
error term. They refer to the instrument as an ‘Imperfect Instrumental Variable’ (IIV).
This is a substantial relaxation of the excludability assumption.
The IIV approach rests on two further assumptions. First, the IIV must be negatively
correlated with the endogenous variable:
ρESf ,CS ≤ 0
Second, the correlations of the IIV and the endogenous variable with the structural error
term must have the same sign:
ρESf ,eρCS,e ≥ 0
Together, these two assumptions imply that the true parameter lies between the OLS and
IV estimates. The third key assumption, that the absolute correlation between the IIV
and the error term is smaller than that between the endogenous variable and the error
term, allows us to tighten this bound.
|ρESf ,e| < |ρCS,e|
If the ratio of the correlations of the structural error term were known, it would be
possible to construct an instrument uncorrelated with the error term. If
ρES,e
ρCS,e
= λ∗, then
the weighted sum V (λ) is a valid instrument:
V (λ) = σCSES
f − λ∗σESfCS
Assumption 3 bounds the ratio λ∗ between zero and one, and so allows us to estimate the
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parameter assuming the ratio is equal to zero (this is the IV estimate assuming a perfect
instrument) and then assuming that the ratio is equal to one. This tightens the bounds
from the OLS estimate.
I use the father’s lagged employment status as an IIV. I use a bootstrap approach to
estimate confidence intervals for the bounds (see Woutersen (2006)): this accounts for the
imprecision of estimates of both the upper and lower bounds.
8.1 Satisfying the assumptions
The first assumption requires that the IIV is negatively correlated with the receipt of
child support and its level. Table 2 shows that each employment status indicator has a
significant negative coefficient. To assess whether the analysis in this paper is amenable
to the IIV approach, I split my outcomes of interest into two groups. The first group is the
amount of government transfers and the indicator for being out of the labour force. For
both of these outcomes, the concern with the OLS estimates is that the receipt of child
support and amount of child support is positively correlated with the structural error
term (receipt of more government transfers is more likely when out of the labour force,
and if government transfers are received then there is a stronger incentive to use Child
Support Collect and so have higher child support receipt). So, the predicted correlation of
the three indicators for father’s employment status with the structural error term should
also be positive. If the father is not working full time, the common characteristics of the
mother and father suggest that the mother should be receiving more government transfers
and be more likely to be out of the labour force. So it is plausible that the correlations
of father’s employment status and the amount of child support with the error term are of
the same sign.
The second group of outcomes consists of market income, total household income,
hours worked, and indicators for being employed and employed full time. For these
variables, the concern is that receipt of child support is negatively correlated with the
error term for OLS approaches: as the mother’s income increases, there is a mechanical
reduction in child support received. If the father is not employed full time, shared char-
acteristics suggest that the mother is likely to have lower market income, lower household
income, work fewer hours and be less likely to be employed. So a negative correlation
between the instruments and the error term is expected. This means that the father’s
employment status indicators and child support receipt are both negatively correlated
with the error term, satisfying the second assumption. It is not clear whether to expect
the father’s employment status indicators to be positively or negatively correlated with
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the error term in the model predicting whether a mother works part time, as working
part time is compatible both with receiving more government transfers and with having
higher market income. I therefore do not report robustness results for working part time.
8.2 Interval estimation results
Results from this robustness check are given in tables 11 and 12. The tables reproduce the
OLS and IV estimates from the tables above, and show interval estimates and confidence
intervals for the Nevo and Rosen approach. These interval estimates provide some evi-
dence in support of the conclusions described above. Table 11 shows results for the receipt
of any child support. OLS results are insignificant, with the exception of a reduction in
full time employment. IV results suggest that child support receipt reduces government
transfers, increases market income and increases hours worked. In all cases except for full
time employment, the OLS point estimates do not lie within the 95% confidence interval
for the IIV interval estimate, so this set of results rules out the conclusion that the receipt
of any child support increases reliance on government transfers or reduces labour market
activity amongst separated mothers. Moreover, there is support for the conclusion that
receiving any child support has a positive effect on employment at the extensive margin:
90% confidence intervals imply a significant increase in the probability of being employed
of between 3.3 and 24 percentage points if any child support is received, and a signifi-
cant reduction in the probability of being out of the labour force of between 0.6 and 44
percentage points.
Table 12 shows similar results for the amount of child support received (conditional
on receiving some child support). Here, OLS results suggest that each dollar of child
support received reduces market income by 56 cents and so only increases gross income
by 50 cents. A $1000 increase in child support is also associated with a 0.6 percentage
point reduction in the probability of working full time and a reduction of 0.2 hours worked
per week. The IV results reverse these conclusions: an increased level of child support
leads to a reduction in government transfers and an increase in market income, reflected
in a reduction in the probability of of being out of the labour force, an increase in the
probability of working full time and an increase in hours worked per week. The IIV
bounds reinforce the rejection of the OLS estimates: with the exception of government
transfers, the OLS results do not lie within the 95% confidence intervals for the IIV
bounds calculated. These IIV bounds rule out a significant negative effect of increased
child support receipt on market income, employment and labour supply. In particular, a
causal reduction in hours worked as a result of an increased amount of child support is
ruled out, and instead a positive effect is indicated.
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Table 11: Interval estimation with Imperfect Instrumental Variables: any child support
receipt
OLS IV IIV bounds
Government transfers 0.385 -8.503∗ [-8.503, -0.567]
standard error (0.410) (3.670)
95% confidence interval (-13.74, 0.214)
90% confidence interval (-12.37, 0.0211)
Market income -2.720 43.329∗ [2.213, 43.33]
standard error (1.988) (3.670)
95% confidence interval (-0.870, 66.65)
90% confidence interval (-0.199, 61.46)
Gross income 2.435 48.923∗ [7.415, 48.92]
standard error (1.806) (14.552)
95% confidence interval (4.580, 73.77)
90% confidence interval (5.185, 66.24)
Not in labour force -0.006 -0.260 [-0.260, -0.0333]
standard error (0.018) (0.164)
95% confidence interval (-0.505, 0.00346)
90% confidence interval (-0.442, -0.00643)
Employed 0.009 0.236 [0.0334, 0.236]
standard error (0.019) (0.159)
95% confidence interval (-0.00280, 0.476)
90% confidence interval (0.00415, 0.414)
Full time -0.048∗ 0.233 [-0.0179, 0.233]
standard error (0.020) (0.153)
95% confidence interval (-0.0495, 0.461)
90% confidence interval (-0.0433, 0.405)
Hours -0.965 12.936∗ [0.525, 12.94]
standard error (0.715) (5.721)
95% confidence interval (-0.629, 22.06)
90% confidence interval (-0.399, 19.75)
Other controls as in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) of tables 2-5. Interval estimates in square brackets,
95% and 90% confidence intervals constructed from Woutersen’s bootstrap approach (1000 replications)
in parentheses.
32
Table 12: Interval estimation with Imperfect Instrumental Variables: amount of child
support
OLS IV IIV bounds
Government transfers 0.028 -0.449+ [-0.449, -0.0524]
standard error (0.045) (0.254)
95% confidence interval (-0.810, 0.0425)
90% confidence interval (-0.734, 0.023)
Market income -0.562∗ 2.627∗ [-0.0251, 2.617]
standard error (0.261) (0.994)
95% confidence interval (-0.396, 3.984)
90% confidence interval (-0.316, 3.669)
Gross income 0.498∗ 3.050∗ [0.929, 3.050]
standard error (0.231) (0.869)
95% confidence interval (0.617, 4.354)
90% confidence interval (0.693, 3.986)
Not in labour force 0.004 -0.029∗ [-0.0291, -0.00120]
standard error (0.002) (0.013)
95% confidence interval (-0.0488, 0.00294)
90% confidence interval (-0.0437, 0.00217)
Employed -0.004 0.031∗ [0.00211, 0.0307]
standard error (0.012) (0.012)
95% confidence interval (-0.00183, 0.0503)
90% confidence interval (-0.00104, 0.0451)
Full time -0.006∗ 0.023∗ [-0.00104, 0.0235]
standard error (0.002) (0.010)
95% confidence interval (-0.00453, 0.0370)
90% confidence interval (-0.00379, 0.0339)
Hours -0.201∗ 1.381∗ [0.0660, 1.381]
standard error (0.087) (0.377)
95% confidence interval (-0.0604, 1.966)
90% confidence interval (-0.0367, 1.815)
Other controls as in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) of tables 2-5. Interval estimates in square brackets,
95% and 90% confidence intervals constructed from Woutersen’s bootstrap approach (1000 replications)
in parentheses.
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Overall, the interval estimation results support the conclusions that receiving any child
support does not increase the receipt of government transfers or reduce the amount of
market income earned, and significantly increases household gross income. Mothers who
receive child support are more likely to be in employment and less likely to be out of
the labour force, and no less likely to be working full time. Conditional on receiving
child support, higher levels do not increase government transfer receipt or reduce market
income. Moreover, any significant reduction in employment levels or hours worked is ruled
out.
9 Conclusion
If all child support is passed directly to the recipient, economic analysis suggests that the
recipient will face a pure income effect, reducing hours worked and discouraging labour
force participation. In Australia, there is popular concern that lone parents receiving
child support are able to choose to live comfortably on a combination of government
transfers and the child support received. However, not all child support paid is received
by the recipient due to the interaction with Family Tax Benefit (Part A). The withdrawal
of FTB when child support is received (through the maintenance income test) leads to
ambiguous predictions of the effect of receiving child support on the recipient’s labour
supply decisions: as the net gain from child support for a benefit recipient falls, the
receipt of any child support, and increases in the level of child support, are more likely
to induce an increase in labour market activity. This is because the recipient keeps all of
the child support when her market income is sufficiently high. This means she is made
strictly better off by working if the amount of child support and the effective tax on it
when not working are both sufficiently high.
The results presented above suggest that the Maintenance Income Test in the Family
Tax Benefit system plays an important role in reducing the labour market disincentives of
child support receipt. Indeed, under the current system the receipt of any child support
increases employment and decreases the probability of being out of the labour force, and
does not reduce hours worked or increase the receipt of government transfers. Increasing
the level of child support among recipients does not discourage participation and does
not decrease hours or employment. Concerns of adverse labour market effects of child
support appear to be unfounded in the current system.
One implication of these results is that marginal increases in the mandated level of child
support would be expected to have no negative effect on labour force participation and
hours worked, and may (given the upper bound of effects estimated above) increase hours
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and employment. This could have short- and longer-term benefits for the welfare of child
support recipients. Moreover, if the policy objective is to increase the income of separated
parents with care of children, reducing the effective tax on child support receipt may
have unintended consequences: removing the interaction between child support receipt
and FTB would remove any work incentives and so could result in lower total income
and negative longer term consequences for separated parents in terms of reduced human
capital and retirement savings.
However, drawing policy conclusions is less clear cut than this. Unlike a government
transfer funded from general taxation, the burden of an increase in the amount of child
support received is borne exclusively by child support payers. Without considering the
welfare implications of this burden, it is not possible to draw conclusions about the de-
sirability of an increase in the level of child support. Given that paying parents are more
likely than the general population to be in receipt of a government pension or allowance
(18% received Newstart Allowance or Disability Support Pension in 2008-09 (Common-
wealth of Australia 2009)), the potential burden of such a change should be considered
carefully.
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